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Fields are contested social arenas. By examining the case of
a single organization, in this case a social enterprise, the author
shows how organizations respond to legitimacy challenges from
members of the field and how such responses shape the organization’s form and practices. At times, organizations endogenize,
that is, incorporate practices from the field. Findings indicate
that responses reflect strategies under constraint. Endogenizing
institutionalized practices constrains managers’ ability to exercise agency. Endogenizing contested practices afford agency by
allowing managers to translate those practices to accord with
local exigencies. This article extends literature on impression management and institutional theory by showing how organizations
respond to diffuse threats to legitimacy. In doing so, this article
advances the study of organizational field dynamics and contention. Organization Management Journal, 10: 240–253, 2013. doi:
10.1080/15416518.2013.851595
Keywords institutions; legitimacy; organizational fields; social
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INTRODUCTION
Scholars of organizations have long understood the importance of the environment to an organization’s survival (Scott
& Davis, 2007). Population ecology began from the realization that organizations with traits selected by the environment
are most likely to survive (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). In contrast, new institutionalism focused on how organizations adapt
to their environments, taking on traits that make them appear
more legitimate (J. W. Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Along this line,
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) groundbreaking work on institutional isomorphism is particularly salient. The article explained
several ways that organizations are profoundly shaped by other
organizations in their environment. The key insight of their
work was in specifying not only the mechanisms of institutional
isomorphism, but also the sources, namely, the organizational
field, “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a
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recognized area of institutional life; key suppliers, resource and
product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983, p. 148).
The application of the notion of fields constituted a significant theoretical breakthrough, making DiMaggio and Powell’s
1983 piece one of the most cited articles in sociology and
launching new institutionalism into the spotlight as a fundamental approach to the study of organizations. Since then, new institutionalists have shown how organizations are shaped as they
“interact frequently and fatefully with each other” (Scott, 1994,
p. 208). According to early insights in new institutionalism, the
process of isomorphism ultimately leads to the structuration
of fields, meaning organizational forms and practices become
institutionalized as they are established as legitimate and reproduced in order to gain and maintain legitimacy (DiMaggio &
Powell, 1991). DiMaggio (1988) was quick to note a key problem with such theories: They privileged structure while largely
ignoring the ability of organizations to act (Hirsch, 1997).
Over time, new institutional thought continued to seek higher
order explanations of mechanisms shaping organizations, often
neglecting actors’ ability to respond to such forces (Barley,
2008; Oliver, 1991; Schneiberg & Clemens, 2006).
More recently, scholars have taken up DiMaggio’s
(1988) call and have begun theorizing the role of institutional entrepreneurs as change agents in organizational
fields (Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009). Institutional
entrepreneurs are those actors empowered to act through
social position (Battilana et al., 2009), through social skill
(Fligstein, 1997), or by recognizing and taking advantage of
favorable situations (McInerney, 2008). However, theories of
institutional entrepreneurs risk trading conceptions of actors as
“institutional dopes” for conceptions of them as “institutional
heroes” (Powell & Colyvas, 2008). The question of how to
conceive of strategic action in a world of institutions remains
problematic, in part because few scholars have examined the
mechanics of intrafield interaction. Criticism is one such form
of interaction that shapes organizational practices that few
scholars have explored.
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Criticism, Contention, and Fields
Fields are contentious social spaces (Bourdieu, 1990;
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Organizational fields have been
called “arenas of power” (Brint & Karabel, 1991). Contention
arises from the inability of actors to reconcile strategy (action)
and constraint (institution) (Jepperson, 1991). A key, but undertheorized, source of contention in fields is criticism, that is, the
act of condemning the activities and behaviors of other actors in
your field. For example, a recent article in Newsweek suggests
that managers “Pick a fight: If you think a competitor is bad,
say so, and the like-minded will rally to your side” (Summers,
2010, p. 47). Criticism attempts to challenge the legitimacy of
its target. In a formal sense, three parties are necessary for criticism: a source, a target, and an audience. The legitimacy of the
source, criticism, and ultimately the target depends on the configuration of actors and the structure of the field. Criticism can
take place in private, semipublic, and public settings. Private
criticism engages directly and exclusively with a specific audience. Complaint is a common form of private criticism in which
the target is also the audience. By semipublic, I mean those
criticisms that take place in meeting rooms and within organizations. The target and audience need not be the same party in
semipublic criticism, though it helps if the criticism gets back to
its target. Public criticism resembles an “open letter” to its audience and is called denunciation. To be effective as “voice,” the
target has to be a member of the audience (Hirschman, 1970).
Criticism can have serious consequences for an organization’s legitimacy. Social movements have developed a variety
of insider and outsider tactics to denounce nonstate actors, such
as corporations (Soule, 2009, pp. 9–19). Research has found
that when taken up by the media (diffusing the message to
an audience), protests can affect stock prices (King & Soule,
2007). Media campaigns are public awareness tactics deployed
by activists to criticize corporations and markets. For example,
though challenged as sexist by many feminist groups, People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) has produced
many well-known print and video campaigns against markets
such as the fur trade (“I’d rather go naked than wear fur”;
PETA, 2011). Activists in Western Europe have successfully targeted the biotech industry to raise awareness of the health and
environmental problems associated with genetic engineering in
agriculture (Schurman, 2004). When successful, criticism can
create opportunities for challengers to proffer new meanings,
establish legitimacy, and ultimately effect institutional change
(Rao, Monin, & Durand, 2003).
Response as Strategy Under Constraint
To maintain or regain legitimacy, targets must respond
strategically to criticism. Strategic responses entail successful interactions with the field at large. While some responses
may be directed at the sources of criticism, effective responses
must be directed at audiences, for example, the field or
powerful actors within it, in order to restore potential loss
of legitimacy. Studies have shown how organizations facing
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legitimacy challenges from the environment engage in impression management (Marcus & Goodman, 1991; Sutton &
Callahan, 1987). Combined with institutional theory, such studies explain how particular responses are likely to quell public
demands after controversies and crises (Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach
& Sutton, 1992). Impression management reflects a strategic
response to institutional demands and resource dependency
pressures. However, strategies of impression management are
constrained not only by their likelihood of success, but also
in the forms they can take. These constraints come from the
resource and institutional environments in which organizations
operate (Oliver, 1991). While organizations must respond to
the loss of legitimacy that can occur during and following specific crises, such crises are rare. Little research has examined
how organizations respond to the everyday criticisms offered
by competing actors in a given organizational field. Threats to
legitimacy arise during specific events, like trade shows (Garud,
2008; McInerney, 2008), as well as the more mundane interactions that occur in organizational fields, such as speaking to
colleagues or publishing opinions on blogs or in the media.
Target organizations must find ways to evaluate such denunciations and their sources in order to determine whether to respond,
and if so, what a response should look like. The resultant fieldlevel politics shapes organizational forms and practices in ways
that few scholars have explored (Johnson, 2008).
Recent work on action in institutions has specified conditions under which actors are empowered with agency and act
strategically (Lawrence, Suddaby, & Leca, 2009b; Zietsma &
Lawrence, 2010). Conceiving of responses as strategic action
endows the target with agency. Emirbayer and Mische (1998,
p. 994) call this the “practical-evaluative dimension of agency.”
As a form of agency, the practical-evaluative dimension is oriented toward the present: in this case, how actors perceive
criticism and determine whether to formulate a response. Under
certain conditions, actors might not have much choice but to
respond in a particular way. For example, they face environmental and structural constraints on their choices of whether and
how to respond (Ingram & Clay, 2000). Public outcry might
garner the attention of policymakers, who in turn might mandate a specific response, as the 2010 BP oil spill demonstrates.
However, under ordinary circumstances, for example, in the
case of everyday contention among actors within fields, targets
must find creative ways to respond to criticism.
Recent work by Fligstein and McAdam (2012) provides an
analytical framework for understanding the dynamic and contentious nature of organizational fields as well as the mechanics
of strategy under constraint. Their book A Theory of Fields
explains the concept of strategic action fields and demonstrates how they work. Strategic action fields are “mesolevel
social orders,” which are “the basic structural building block
of modern political/organizational life in the economy, civil
society, and the state” (Fligstein & McAdam, 2012, p. 3).
The theory describes fields operating like a series of nested
dolls. Fields operate across levels of analysis; for example, a
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unit within an organization is a field that is nested within the
organization, which is itself a field nested in an organizational
field. Organizational fields are nested in larger organizational
fields, and so on. Fligstein and McAdam present a compelling
theory of stability and change, which begins to explain strategic action under constraint. According to the authors, actors
explain the role of social skill, that is, the ability to read social
situations and compel others to cooperate with them, in empowering actors toward agency. Differential access to resources,
which are unevenly distributed across fields, explains power
inequalities. Furthermore, incumbents have interest in maintaining institutional arrangements. These incumbents and the
institutional arrangements they help maintain act as constraints
on the agency of challengers. One of the key problems with this
theory is that it does not specify the mechanisms responsible for
shaping interactions between strategic actions fields operating
at different levels of analysis. For example, what explains how
institutional arrangements at the organizational field level shape
what managers do at the level of the intraorganizational field?
This article uses data from a longitudinal ethnography of
a social enterprise to explain how legitimacy operates across
strategic action fields operating at different levels. In it, I use
the concept of criticism as a mechanism that instigates or constrains agency. Managers operating within the strategic action
field of an organization must find ways to appear coherent and
sensible in the face of legitimacy challenges operating at the
supraorganizational level. This article analyzes the case of a
social enterprise to explain how criticism acts as a mechanism
that shapes interactions across strategic action fields operating
at different levels.

Social Enterprise as a Strategic Research Site
This article analyzes the case of a social enterprise to understand how organizations respond strategically to criticism from
actors in the field. Because they bridge institutions, social
enterprises are particularly vulnerable to legitimacy challenges
(McInerney, 2012). Social enterprises assemble business-like
structures, practices, and routines to produce social, as opposed
to private, returns (Dart, 2004b; Di Domenico, Haugh, &
Tracey, 2010). As such, they operate simultaneously in at least
two moral domains: the business and voluntary sectors. Social
enterprises bring together values from these seemingly incompatible worlds and must find ways to be accountable to each.
Straddling two worlds as they do, social enterprises are challenged to justify their actions to both sides of an ostensibly
intractable chasm. Because people from Wall Street and the voluntary sector are likely to take different moral standpoints (e.g.,
market versus civic orders of worth; Boltanski & Thévenot,
1991, 1999, 2006) when judging the organization’s activities,
social enterprises face particularly rugged critical landscapes.
Social enterprises thus trade between worlds, a social space
that affords economic opportunity at the risk of criticism (Barth,
2000). Battilana and Dorado (2010) show that success for social

enterprises depends on the ability of leaders to reconcile contradictory institutional logics and present their organizations
to members of diverse institutional environments as cohesive,
coherent wholes. However, in a series of studies, Stark and colleagues (Bach & Stark, 2002; Beunza & Stark, 2004; Girard &
Stark, 2003; Neff & Stark, 2003; Stark, 1999, 2009) find that the
diversity of evaluative frameworks affords the friction necessary
for innovation and entrepreneurship. Therefore, the challenge
for social enterprises is to balance coherence and friction, that
is, to conform to institutional constraints while preserving a
space for strategic action.

METHODS
The data for this study come from a multisited, field-level
ethnography of nonprofit technology assistance providers in
the United States between May 2001 and November 2004.
Nonprofit technology assistance providers (NTAPs) are organizations or individuals that deliver information technology
consulting and/or training services to nonprofit and grassroots organizations. My primary field site was NPower NY, an
entrepreneurial nonprofit in New York City. Fieldwork began
only two months after the organization began working with
clients, and continued for the first 21/2 years that NPower NY
operated. From this vantage, I was able to collect data about
a social enterprise from its very inception. Beyond NPower
NY, I conducted fieldwork at additional NTAPs and events at
which they convened throughout the United States. Therefore,
my ethnography afforded me the opportunity to see how denunciations from the field were integrated into the organization as it
developed, treating the organization itself as an ongoing process
(Van de Ven & Huber, 1990).
The ethnography consisted of 15–20 hours per week of
participant observation at NPower NY’s office ,as well as additional observations at conferences, events, and client sites.
To gain access, I volunteered at NPower NY, helping the organization plan its workforce development program. In exchange,
I was granted nearly unlimited access to the organization, its
staff, and its files. Observational data were recorded in field
notebooks. Because I had my laptop at hand when at the office,
I was often able to rewrite my jottings into full-fledged field
notes almost immediately after recording them. This arrangement allowed me to keep accurate field notes, freeing me from
problems associated with remembering the particulars of daily
events, especially direct quotations.
To supplement observational data, I conducted formal interviews, ranging from 40 minutes to 2 hours, with all of NPower
NY’s staff members, including two board members. Additional
interviews were conducted with leaders of competing organizations, foundation program officers, and representatives from
corporate sponsors. In total, data from 42 formal interviews
were analyzed for this article. Aside from formal interviews, I
conducted countless informal interviews ranging from 5-minute
conversations around the water cooler to 2-hour discussions
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on subway rides to visit clients or during after-hours gatherings at local bars and restaurants. All formal interviews
were tape-recorded (except for two respondents who refused
to be recorded) and transcribed. To triangulate observation and
interview data, I collected physical and electronic documents
throughout my time in the field. Physical documents included
memos, business plans, promotional materials, employee handbooks and manuals, board reports, and other official organizational documents. Electronic documents I collected include
e-mails, websites, memos, consulting records, tax forms, and
internal reports. Documents provide researchers with “official”
representations of organizational processes and record how such
processes develop over time (Hodder, 2000).
Field notes, interview transcripts, and other documents were
then coded according to emergent themes (Emerson, Fretz, &
Shaw, 1995). Preliminary codes were recoded iteratively to
make further sense of the data. Among the codes that emerged
was the presence of denunciations. Aside from public settings,
such as conferences, denunciations took place during board or
staff meetings or throughout the course of everyday work at the
organization ,as well as in formal interviews.

FINDINGS
The strategic action field of nonprofit technology assistance
providers (hereafter NTAPs) began in the late 1990s with the
introduction of activist-driven, foundation-supported models of
technology assistance to nonprofit and grass-roots organizations. Modeled on a social movement, technology activists
called “Circuit Riders” dedicated themselves to promoting
social justice and environmentalism through building the technology capacity of aligned social movements (McInerney,
2007). Their particular model of activism was built around the
idea that social movement organizations would be more effective at accomplishing their goals if they could take advantage of
the information technologies that were becoming more widely
available at the time. As the founder of one nonprofit foundation that supported the Circuit Riders told me, “I was astounded
at how far behind the nonprofit sector was in the environmental
community and I suspect more broadly in the use of technology and the understanding of how it can be a strategic tool to
communicate information in particular, both internally within
an organization and externally to the public at large” (personal
interview, September 3, 2003).
The Circuit Riders worked with nonprofit and grass-roots
organizations to build databases, file servers, and websites and
to facilitate the use of e-mail. The ethos and ideology of the
Circuit Riders was very much built around their identity as
activists, as well as their connection to the movements they
served. An early report by a foundation supporting the Circuit
Riders explained, “We didn’t want a pocket protector computer geek. No one who saw the world only in bits and bytes.
Instead, we looked for someone who understood politics and the
political process. Someone who’d be as comfortable in the halls
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of Congress as in the innards of a software program” (TCN,
1996, p. 4).
NPower launched in 1999 with funding from Microsoft,
eventually growing to a network of 12 independently incorporated 501(c)(3) NTAPs throughout the United States. In contrast
to the Circuit Riders, NPower had an intensely entrepreneurial
drive, which included fostering close relationships with forprofit corporations and a particularly business-like approach to
working with nonprofit organizations. As a result, NPower organized as a social enterprise, reflecting a hybrid between the
dedication to do-gooder organizations held by the Circuit Riders
and attention to business principles and practices espoused by
their for-profit partners. For example, NPower charged nonprofit organizations directly, rather than relying exclusively on
foundation support. More important, NPower considered itself
a consulting organization in the nonprofit sector, rather than
a group of activists. Where the Circuit Riders worked exclusively with social justice and environmental groups, NPower
was agnostic to the mission of a nonprofit organization. The
founder of NPower explained at a meeting, “We are about
serving the nonprofit sector. It is that passion for helping nonprofits make a difference in their community that drives our
work. It really is about that impact. Because of our work, are
lives being improved? Are communities stronger? What is the
impact? That is our mission: to help nonprofits have the tools to
really serve their communities” (field notes, October 16, 2002).
The language of impact reflected a discursive and practical shift
away from the activist priorities of the Circuit Riders toward
the logic of efficiency and effectiveness that became pervasive in the nonprofit sector during the early 2000s. That logic
was reflected in the performance metrics NPower developed
throughout its existence.
NPower NY was founded in 2001, as the first affiliate resulting from the national expansion funded by Microsoft. The
organization also took the form of a social enterprise. However,
it developed principles and practices even further removed from
the activist roots of the field. From its inception, NPower NY
partnered with several for-profit corporations, which isomorphically shaped the organization. Aside from its founding support
from Microsoft, NPower NY secured collaborative relationships
with several key technology and financial firms, including JP
Morgan Chase, Accenture Consulting, Cisco, New Horizons,
and Dell. These partnerships provided material support, volunteers, and staff, as well as technical support. Material support
took the forms of both cash and in-kind donations. For example, Microsoft donated $750,000 in cash to start NPower NY,
as well as software for the organization to use, distribute, and
install at client sites.
New York City has far more nonprofit organizations than
can reasonably be serviced by the existing number of nonprofit technology assistance providers. As the executive director
of NPower NY told me in an interview, “We are in a huge
space, so there’s so much to be done that I do not feel like
we are competing for work. We [NPower NY and area NTAPs]
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rarely bump into each other, which I think just speaks to how
much need there is” (personal interview, December 8, 2003).
Rather than clients, NTAPs compete for legitimacy, worth, and
resources. In my fieldwork, I ran across very few instances
in which NPower NY competed directly with another NTAP
for clients. However, there were many occasions during which
NPower NY competed with NTAPs for the little foundation
funding available for technology assistance, either as direct
grants to the NTAP or when foundations acted as third-party
payers for nonprofit organizations to receive their services.
Since Circuit Riders did not charge clients directly for their
services, foundation support was crucial to their operations.
However, NPower NY also relied on foundation funding. The
organization had to keep fees reasonably low, at times offering
services pro bono, to attract clients. To gain access to foundation resources, NTAPs had to establish the moral legitimacy of
their activities, that is, that they were doing technology assistance in the nonprofit sector the way it “ought” to be done. This
form of competition meant that organizations in the field were
particularly vulnerable to legitimacy challenges.
Raising Startup Funds
NPower NY received donations from for-profit and nonprofit
sources before starting service delivery. The primary source
of startup funding was a grant from Microsoft to expand the
NPower network nationally. One of the conditions Microsoft
set on its funding was for the startup to identify matching
funds from the local community. As a director from Microsoft
explained, “[Microsoft] would provide substantial capital funding, sort of like seed funding for 3 years, up to $250 [thousand]
per year for 3 years, plus software, professional support services, connections to our local field offices for volunteers, or
board members or whatever is appropriate for that NPower.
As long as the local community came together and matched the
money” (personal interview, June 6, 2002). Of NPower NY, she
said, “In New York, heck, they already had the funders there.
Their funding dwarfed what Microsoft was bringing. If someone asks you what has been the most successful startup [among
NPower affiliates], it was probably New York” (personal interview, June 6, 2002).
With its close ties to local businesses and foundations,
NPower NY was able to raise matching funds without trouble. These close ties included a relationship to Accenture, the
multinational consulting firm. Accenture provided financial and
technical support to the fledgling NPower NY, including office
space to incubate the organization and pro bono consulting staff
to help get it started. NPower NY also had close connections to
JP Morgan Chase, which provided financial support. In the nonprofit sector, the organization received funding from the Robin
Hood Foundation, which supports social enterprise on principle. However, more important, the foundation offered access to
a pool of clients, paying NPower NY for services provided to
their grantees. This put NPower NY in good financial standing.
An officer at the Robin Hood Foundation told me:

If you look at this from the perspective of nonprofits generally,
one of the unique things about NPower NY is that they raised their
startup capital prior to every delivering a service, which is very
unusual. Most people start out of a storefront delivering services and
then go about back filling the need for money. I think what that has
allowed NPower NY to do is to really be very conscious about how
soon do they get out there, what they promise, and not letting the
delivery of services run ahead of their capitalization. So it is little bit
more like a business model. (personal interview, January 27, 2004)

By the end of their first year of operations, NPower NY’s
budget, as reported on 990 tax forms was $3.2 million, $3 million of which was donated. Because much of this largesse was
dedicated startup money, this early success in fundraising was
not repeated in subsequent years. However, NPower NY sought
ways to maintain large operating budgets by increasing the
amount of earned revenues it produced.
The Drive Toward Earned Revenue at NPower NY
From the outset, NPower NY was driven by market principles, which were manifested in practices designed to generate
earned revenue. In particular, the organization developed consulting and training departments expressly to earn revenue
through client fees. Clients were billed hourly for on-site consulting and by the class for training, which often took place
in NPower NY’s computer lab (though the organization did
at times develop curricula for larger organizations that were
delivered on-site).
Generating earned revenue was more complicated than
would first appear. For one, technology adoption in the nonprofit
sector tends to lag behind business and government (Corder,
2001). Compounding this problem is a lack of money for
technology investments (Kirschenbaum & Kunamneni, 2001)
and expertise to take advantage of them (Robertson, 2001;
Treuhaft, Chandler, Kirschenbaum, Magallanes, & Pinkett,
2007). Furthermore, there is a cultural aversion to technology
in a sector that is ostensibly about working with people, not
machines (Berlinger & Te’eni, 1999; Stein, 2002). NPower NY
faced these problems in trying start its organization, which
is why access to the Robin Hood Foundation’s portfolio of
grantees proved so fortuitous early on. It allowed the organization to roll out operations with a stable client base with
guaranteed revenue from a third-party payer. The challenge of
generating earned revenue in this environment was felt acutely
by managers at NPower NY. This excerpt from my field notes
demonstrates this:
I met [one of NPower NY’s managers] at the airport this morning. Immediately she started discussing a conversation she had with
[the executive director] last night. [The executive director] was concerned about criticisms of the organization around how their services
were not affordable to small nonprofits. “They expect services for
free,” [the manager] reported. [The executive director] has gestured
toward lowering the costs of services, but wondered at what cost to
the agency. The board, especially the chair, wants a revenue model
yielding self-sustenance. (field notes, April 11, 2002)
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By self-sustenance, the board means financial sustainability,
that is, generating enough earned revenue such that the organization could rely much less on donated revenue, particularly
donated revenue from any particular source.
Understood as a resource dependency problem, such a drive
makes sense. Earning revenues reduces dependence on foundations, which are often positioned to make demands on the organization, resulting in a power imbalance (Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). However, there are also institutional reasons for pressing
the organization to generate earned revenues. In the world of
social enterprise, legitimacy stems from an organization’s ability to sustain itself financially (Bielefeld, 2006; Young, 2006).
Earned revenue begets donated revenue. Foundations rewarded
NPower NY’s market-based approached to service delivery
because it reflected the commercial logic of the nonprofit sector
(Eikenberry & Kluver, 2004; Weisbrod, 1998). Again, from the
officer from the Robin Hood Foundation:
NPower [NY] is very different [from other nonprofit
organizations] in that there is really a predictable revenue stream
from the services that they are providing. If they can be competitive
there really is a niche and a need for those kind of services. I do
not believe that the need for underwriting support is ever going to
go away, but I think that it can be decreased to something that is a
viable model. (personal interview, January 27, 2004)

It is a logic of self-fulfillment: Earned revenue demonstrates
legitimacy, which generates donations; donations demonstrate
legitimacy, which generates earned revenues. Where once nonprofit organizations were evaluated on the social goods they produced, now they were being evaluated based on their economic
performance.
The drive to generate earned revenue originated with the
board, but was felt throughout the organization. NPower NY’s
board consisted primarily of leaders from for-profit organizations, such as JP Morgan Chase, Microsoft, and Accenture.
To achieve these directives, NPower NY began to model its
consulting operations on those of Accenture. As the executive director mentioned at a meeting, “We are working with [a
board member from Accenture] on a 2 year plan for consulting. We are tweaking our consulting model. We want to know
how to scale the department by understanding how Accenture
does their model” (field notes, April 4, 2002). In practice, this
meant managing consultants’ time to maximize billable hours.
To do so, consultants would first have to track those hours. This
made sense as a strategy, because performance metrics focus
managers’ and staff’s attention on the activities being measured
(M. W. Meyer, 1994), which would ostensibly drive them to
pursue those activities. From my field notes:
[The director of operations] began the meeting by discussing the
new policy of tracking hours that will come into effect. Starting with
consultants, NPower employees will be responsible for tracking their
hours throughout the day. They will use the Changepoint system to
track hours. She explained that this way, they can forecast the time
available for consulting as well as the revenue coming in as a result.
She said that it may seem overwhelming at first, but she got used to
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doing it at Accenture. She explained that all consulting businesses
do such things. Then she asked the Accenture people to describe the
processes they use to make the task easier. There is even a line item
for the time spent entering the time data. There will also be a project
time feature that will allow people to assign tasks and the time spent
on them. (field notes, September 4, 2001)

Consultants were concerned about their ability to make
hours. At one point, a consultant took me aside and told me
he was concerned about his job. “If I continue to not make my
hours, I might be fired. They have switched their concerns at
NPower. They are more concerned about making billable hours.
It is more like a for-profit now. It is what the board wants. The
board is mostly made up of for-profit people. NPower NY is a
business. They point to Accenture and say the consultants there
have 100% of their hours billable” (field notes, May 2, 2002).
The pressure to maximize billable hours came from board
members, who viewed their role as making NPower NY sustainable from a financial standpoint. Since many of the board
members hailed from the for-profit sector, financial sustainability meant generating earned revenue through efficiency gains,
for example, increasing billable hours for consultants. This
extended exchange at a board meeting demonstrates the point:
[Board member one] asked about billable hours.
[The director of operations] said that in 2002, we were not as
efficient as we could be. We set a goal for 2400 billable hours. That
works out to 24 hours per week of billable consulting hours. The subcontractors bill about 1500 hours, but they do not cost us anything.
We do not break even with consultants. She said that we would need
7200 hours to break even next year.
[Board member two] said that there are different revenue
streams. He said we should break out revenues by business. He said
he would like to see the net revenue model. He said we have to figure
out billing to cover costs. We need to figure out how to cover costs,
we want to make discounts, but we consider that a contribution.
[The director of operations] said that it costs the organization
$258 for consulting per hour. She said we have not been billing
24 hours per week on a consistent basis. She said we are figuring
out ways to allocate hours geographically and more efficiently.
[Board member three] said we need to bring in more revenue.
[The executive director] said that we need to be clear with consultants as far as the feedback loop–strategic and management piece
to “put this house back in order.” She said we need to put efficiency
in place. She said we are adjusting our sliding scale fee. We are
rigidly tied to a scale. We are adjusting the fee categories adding a
tier at the top and a tier at the bottom. This will reduce barriers to
smaller organizations. She said we will increase fees at the higher
end to make up for losses on the lower end.
[Board member two] said that we should make a profit at the
high end.
[The executive director] said we have to poise ourselves to
recoup costs at the high end.
[Board member two] said that there is a lot that you cannot
service. We cannot afford to send people out to some places.
[Board member three] spoke about operating costs and earned
income. What are our true costs? What will the market bear? I
want to see this organization act as a startup and gain a competitive
advantage in the market.
[The director of operations] said that if we get too close to meeting these earned income levels, that we risk losing our nonprofit
status.

246

P.-B. MCINERNEY

TABLE 1
Donated versus earned revenues 2001–2005
Year

Donations

Earned

Total operating
budget

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

$3,056,001
$1,312,650
$1,255,865
$2,152,908
$1,594,071

$134,132
$345,224
$744,257
$1,167,705
$1,296,574

$3,218,258
$1,714,142
$2,058,647
$3,321,279
$2,880,722

Percent
earned
4%
20%
36%
35%
45%

Source: IRS form 990, years 2001–2005.
[Board member two] said he was not worried about that. He said
we lose money on other ventures, like TSC. (field notes, December
5, 2002)

The market practices NPower NY adopted to generate earned
revenue proved successful over time. An analysis of 990 tax
forms for the first 5 years of operations shows that NPower NY
was able to increase its earned revenue by almost 10-fold over
this time. Table 1 shows the growth of earned revenues.
Success at generating earned revenue proved to have downsides as well. NPower NY’s earned revenue made it difficult to
raise donations at times. As noted earlier, nonprofit foundations
struggled to understand NPower NY’s purpose and mission and
bristled at its associations with large, for-profit corporations.
As the manager of development told me, “We get, ‘aren’t you
Microsoft?’ I am like, ‘we were formed by Microsoft.’ I cannot
tell you how many times I have to explain that. They are helpful in that they can leverage money. They are very big players
and they have made financial investments and not for one year,
but for two or three. That is the good and the bad” (personal
interview, April 10, 2003). Furthermore, prospective for-profit
supporters felt “crowded out” by existing for-profit supporters.
Again, the manager of development speaks:
We have corporations that go “you are in with my competition.
[Does] this program belong to them? Is there a brand on this program?” It is like having a goody bag at an event. You cannot put
Ralph Lauren and Estee Lauder Perfume in the same bag. (personal
interview, April 10, 2003)

Yet despite these challenges, NPower NY was able to maintain a
high level of donations throughout its first 5 years of operations,
as Table 1 shows.
Criticism From the Field
Legitimacy from foundations and corporate partners did
not mean legitimacy from other organizations in the field.
Challenges came primarily from competing NTAPs and was
based on the criticism of NPower NY’s fervent embrace of
businesslike practices and ideals. For example, a member of
one competing NTAP known for working with social justice
groups called NPower “the Wal-Mart of nonprofit technology assistance providers” (personal interview, July 16, 2003).

While many nonprofit organizations are increasingly engaging
in business-like behavior (Dart, 2004a), NPower National and
NPower NY were often accused of taking it to an extreme,
subverting the social justice ideals upon which the field was
founded (McInerney, 2007). As the leader of a competing NTAP
explained, “To a lot of social advocates [NTAPs concerned
with social justice], it [NPower] felt much more like a corporate entity coming through” (personal interview, September 16,
2003).
NTAPs recognized NPower’s success in attracting resources,
particularly the limited pool of foundation funding available for
technology assistance. As one of the founders of the NTAP field
who later worked for a foundation explained:
They compete. Really, they do, for dollars. And especially lately,
NPower, which I think is a terrific organization. It is a terrific organization for a number of reasons, A) it is very fundable, B) it has
got great pizzazz, or recognition of its name. It has got a great track
record. People seem to like it. It has come in and created perceptions
like “we have been doing this forever, why is NPower now getting
the money?” So yeah, there is this new versus old dichotomy there.
(personal interview, August 6, 2002)

Another leader in the NTAP field told me:
With NPower, there is a bit of the David and Goliath issue
early on because it was such a small pot of funds that everyone
was going for that NPower came in as a massive Goliath. They
had all that Microsoft funding which then spurred additional funding. I think there was a little of, I would call it envy from smaller
groups that NPower is coming in and getting so much support and
basically sweeping the top levels of funders in this massive wave.
(personal interview, September 16, 2003). Both quotes illustrate
that NPower National and NPower NY benefited from a “Matthew
Effect” with regard to funding: The more money they had, the more
they received (Merton, 1968). This was particularly true for funding
from Microsoft, which was one of the few corporate funding sources
for technology assistance at the time. As the head of an NTAP told
me about the period after NPower opened an office in New York,
“We were looking for a grant from Microsoft a year ago and basically found out that all the money that Microsoft gives, they give to
NPower so there is not anything for other folks” (personal interview,
October 10, 2003).
NTAPs criticized NPower NY as beholden to corporate interests
by virtue of the funding these companies supplied. The head of one
NTAP in New York told me how his organization was different from
NPower NY:
Any group that is politically not in line with social justice, we
just do not work with them. That is not even hard. . . . Because we
are not like NPower. We are not like groups that have a big public
reputation as being an independent, neutral NTAP. There is one guy
I met from NPower that is like “We will work with the NRA. We are
here not to be ideological and to do that.” [Our organization] is a
political organization. It is explicitly so. There is no wavering or
doubt. NPower is afraid that the NRA is going to say that NPower is
a bunch of lefties and they do not want to work with us. If they say
that about us, great. NPower also gets corporate funding and it is a
whole different ballpark. (personal interview, September 5, 2003)

Throughout my interviews and time in the field, the organization’s close ties to Microsoft arose in conversation. “I think
some people were concerned because it was Microsoft-driven,”
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a leader in the field told me (personal interview, December 10,
2003). At the time, Microsoft was locked in a legal battle with
the Department of Justice over monopolistic practices. NTAPs
were particularly suspicious of NPower’s national expansion,
of which the New York office was the vanguard. The executive
director of one NTAP that considered partnering with NPower
said:
Honestly their hookup with Microsoft, this is the confidential
part, I would say was both attractive and repulsive. We had no illusions about why Microsoft is interested in us. As soon as I came
to understand that this NPower partnership and the corporate giving
piece was located in the corporate structure of Microsoft and department headed by their chief legal counsel, during the whole justice
department thing, it was obvious what this was all about. There is an
irony in deciding that you are going to be part of someone’s strategy
to defend you know the most horrendous monopolistic practices, but
on the other hand we thought “gee, we actually use some Microsoft
products.” (personal interview, July 8, 2003)

The fear was that NPower’s business model would drown
out the activist mission of NTAPs that could not compete in
the market. Some thought NTAPs would have to conform to
NPower’s model to survive:
Use NPower as your sample and watch how Compumentor,
Compass Point, probably ITRC [large NTAPs in the field] have all
changed. It would be interesting to go back and look over the last
three to four years how the products, the services, the mission have
all started looking like NPower. It is good to have NPower, just as
long as everyone is not NPower. They have this Microsoft mentality
to make everyone look like us. (personal interview, September 16,
2003)

Detractors developed a derogatory label for the organization
based on this sentiment, calling it “N-pire.”
Criticism Shapes Organizations
Management and staff at NPower NY were aware of these
criticisms, particularly as they related to Microsoft. One manager told me:
I think that you have relationships that hinder us. Whether these
companies have good reputations or bad reputations, they kind of
fall on us. We get that a lot with Microsoft, unfortunately. Funders
either have a good perception or they think that they are the evilest
thing since the plague. (personal interview, April 10, 2003)

The reaction to these criticisms shaped the way staff at NPower
NY engaged with the organization, as well as the ways managers structured the organization and its practices.
Employees often struggled with the moral dissonance
between drives toward making money and the charitable ethos
of the nonprofit sector. This tension was reflected in criticism
of NPower NY’s partnerships with for-profit organizations,
especially large multinational corporations. While business–
nonprofit partnerships are increasing in number, they remain
a moral gray area for many in the sector (Galaskiewicz &
Colman, 2006). Such partnerships put the nonprofit organizations and their for-profit partners in positions to have their
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activities judged from multiple and contradictory moral standpoints, rendering both sides vulnerable to criticism from various
stakeholders. For example, one NPower NY consultant, a selfprofessed Marxist, told me, “I do not necessarily like where we
get our money. Our money comes from venture capitalists and
investment bank firms who are stealing from everyone else. And
I feel like in some ways I am facilitating that theft” (personal
interview, July 31, 2001). An employee charged with managing membership with clients explained that NPower NY was
“business-y. There is not warm and fuzzy nonprofit feeling.
It makes it hard to think of this job as rewarding” (personal
interview, November 29, 2001). Another consultant stated it
more profoundly: “What do you expect?” he said, referring to
NPower NY’s founding partnerships with for-profit firms, “the
seeds are sown in sour soil” (personal interview, January 13,
2003).
Employees also resisted being evaluated on for-profit criteria. Consultants in particular criticized the continued pressure to
increase their ratio of billable to nonbillable hours. Aside from
the labor issues related to increased productivity and threats to
their professional autonomy, consultants were concerned with
how they would be judged by clients during site visits. Clients
would often ask consultants to do minor tasks, like install a
printer on their computer network. Rather than writing up a
new ticket for the task, the consultants would often do the
work pro bono and simply not report doing it to their supervisors. The result was a constant tension between the board’s
call for increased revenue and the consultants’ desire to help the
organizations they were sent to service.
Often, however, staff at NPower NY were ambivalent about
the business-like environment in which they worked. They
understood the significance of the resources made available to
the organization by virtue of partnerships with large corporations. At they same time, they were aware of the drawbacks:
I think [having corporate partners] is a double-edged sword.
I feel like it is really good in some ways and it is really bad in
some ways. The really good side is the resources that are afforded
to us. For example the Accenture resources, that is amazing. I cannot even comprehend what that has done for the organization. The
list goes on in terms of additional resources and capacity that we
have been afforded because of the board relationships. But I also
feel that with that comes a little more control over the work that we
do or the direction in which we go. So, there’s definitely like the
entrepreneurial, small-business feel rather than grassroots. (personal
interview, February 27, 2003)

Because of this ambivalence toward corporate partnerships,
the executive director took care to distance NPower NY from
its corporate partners at key moments in their relationship. For
example, the organization postponed its 2001 launch event until
after Microsoft released Windows XP. The given reason was
to avoid having to share the spotlight with Microsoft. Equally
important, however, was for NPower NY to have critical distance to convey a separate identity from its major corporate
partners to avoid the moral ambiguity associated with having
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such relationships. In another example, NPower NY built a technology portal website for nonprofit organizations that offered
Microsoft software at a deep discount. In the staff meeting announcing the website’s launch, the executive director
expressed caution promoting it: “We do not want to be viewed
as shilling for these large corporations. We have to be careful
about what we end up doing. We can be viewed as making
money on this” (field notes, January 15, 2002).
Endogenizing
In response to some claims that the organization privileged
business over charity, NPower NY incorporated certain organizational practices from the field, a process I call endogenizing.
To combat the perception of NPower NY as “corporate entity”
and being too “business-like” the organization adopted two
practices: First, NPower NY arranged volunteer efforts in the
local nonprofit community called Days of Service. Second,
NPower NY modified the sliding-scale fee structure, creating
a matrix fee structure. Both examples show how responses to
criticism structure organizational practices. Days of Service
were an institutionalized practice in the field, which constrained
NPower NY’s ability to modify them to reflect organizational
imperatives. Fee structures, however, were less established
among NTAPs, particularly as many still operated under thirdparty payer models. This arrangement offered managers at
NPower NY great latitude to act as agents, that is, to translate
existing practices to local exigencies.
Endogenizing as Constraint
The idea for Days of Service was hatched at an organizational retreat. Concerned that the organization was seen as
too business-like, the executive director suggested NPower NY
participate in more community service activities, calling them
“Days of Service.” The following excerpt from my field notes
illustrates: “[The executive director] said that if we want recognition as a nonprofit in the sector, it is important that we
do community service, like a ‘day of service’” (field notes,
February 12, 2002).
“Days of Service” were already widely accepted among
NTAPs in the field as a legitimate charitable activity. The activity began in 2000 when activist groups organized volunteers
to help the local nonprofit sector in Kansas City, where they
were hosting a conference. By adopting “days of service” as an
organizational practice, NPower NY was incorporating legitimate practices into the field into its organizational repertoire as
a way of demonstrating charitable worth, i.e., that it valued volunteerism and not just the bottom line. The first Day of Service
took place in April 2002. With fewer than 30 organizations
participating, it was relatively small and low-key. The Day of
Service consisted of staff members volunteering their Saturdays
to visit nearby nonprofit organizations to do basic maintenance,
like running utilities, and install free antivirus software. At the
next staff meeting, volunteers shared stories about the outdated

computers and the lack of technical training they encountered
throughout the day, highlighting the need for technology assistance among the smallest nonprofit organizations in the city
(field notes, April 23, 2002).
Most significant among these “Days of Service” efforts
was the “Virus Vaccination Days.” During Virus Vaccination
Days, NPower NY would leverage their corporate partners for
virus protection software, which they would install for free on
the computers of nonprofits, regardless of whether they had
contracted for services with the organization. As the NPower
NY grew, it continued to organize these “Days of Service,”
eventually incorporating them into the job description of the
Membership Coordinator. Virus Vaccination Days were a way
of responding to the criticism that the organization was too
business-like or too “focused on the bottom line.” A cynical interpretation could be that Virus Vaccination Days were
simply marketing tactics. However, NPower NY enrolled volunteers from outside of the organization, including employees
of their for-profit partners, independent consultants to the nonprofit sector, and workers from ostensibly competing NTAPs.
An example from my field notes about planning the 2003 Day
of Service: “[One manager] said that she reached out to [a
manager] from the Fund [for the City of New York], as well as
[the head of the LINC Project] and others from Media Jumpstart
to show collaborative spirit with them, to demonstrate that
NPower NY was willing to collaborate with others” (field notes,
May 9, 2003). Days of Service became part of the organization’s
practices. NPower NY incorporated the task of organizing them
into the job description of the Membership Coordinator. The
organization continued to engage in regular Virus Vaccination
Days and subsequently organized additional Days of Service
around topics such as data backups and online security. The
adoption of Days of Service enabled NPower NY to make and
substantiate claims that it valued the institution of volunteerism
in the nonprofit sector.
NPower NY’s Days of Service strongly resembled the institutionalized practice in the field. Managers felt they had little
ability (agency) to change them to reflect board directives, for
example, by deploying corporate sponsorships or marketing tactics. As such, the adoption of the Days of Service model as an
expression of volunteerism reflects the constraints on managers’
agency. This is not to say that managers had to adopt Days
of Service as a response to criticism in the field. Rather, once
managers chose to adopt Days of Service, they had limited ability to modify the activity, lest they open themselves up to further
criticism from other NTAPs.
Endogenizing as Agency
Another response to the criticism that the organization was
too businesslike and focused too heavily on the bottom line
was to develop a matrix fee structure. Even with a slidingscale fee structure, NPower NY had developed a reputation for
expensive services, largely out of the reach of smaller nonprofit
organizations. As of 2002, NPower NY’s fees ranged from
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$75 to $150 per hour, depending on the size of the organization
and whether it was a member. Recall from the board meeting
exchange earlier that NPower NY had an imperative to generate
earned revenue. However, unlike Days of Service, fee structures
were not institutionalized among NTAPs. By means of comparison, the head of one NTAP told me, “We have actually recently
increased our fee for service rates to try to help recover more
of the cost of doing [hands-on consulting] work. When we first
got started, we were charging very, very low rates. Our initial
fee scale ranged from $15 an hour to $65 an hour, depending on
the budget size of the organization, and now we are charging a
flat rate of $60, regardless of the budget size of the organization”
(personal interview, July 16, 2003). The head of another NTAP
explained, “We used to have a sliding scale but we decided it
was more trouble than it was worth so we collapsed it down.
And in addition to that, there are some cases where we have
additional subsidy money that is targeted on certain areas, for
example we have some grants to cover scheduled support services, so that subsidized the cost down even further. We have
some grants that cover support and consulting services for certain groups and that subsidizes it down even further. We also
apply a certain amount of our support money, so we do a bunch
of assessment and planning work at no cost to groups” (personal
interview, July 15, 2003).
To respond to the criticism that it was too focused on the
bottom line, managers at NPower NY devised a matrix fee structure, based on the budget of the client and the level of difficulty
of the engagement, which it implemented in mid-2003. This
modification reflects a translation of existing practices in the
environment to account for local exigencies, like the imperative toward earned revenue (Czarniawska & Sevon, 1996;
Sahlin-Andersson, 1996). The lower end of the fee structure
charged small nonprofits fees below-market rates. These fees
were subsidized by charging wealthier nonprofit organizations
much higher rates. Additionally, the executive director and
board strategized that larger nonprofits would likely need more
complex services, which would also come at a premium. The
executive director explained the fee structure in a consultants’
meeting:
We are moving toward 3 tiers and 3 categories for consulting
projects. This will be based on the skill sets necessary to get the work
done. These are general guidelines for the pricing. Many projects
will be priced differently in the future. The lowest level is actually
lower than the present pricing; it includes most scheduled support
and basic Web design. The middle is a step up; it includes low-end
networking and database as well as high-end scheduled support. The
high level includes strategic planning and complex work—the work
that requires higher level skills that we have to pay for. With work
that cuts across these tiers, we will have to work out a blended rate.
We also added a new category of nonprofit, those organizations with
budgets greater than $10M. (field notes, April 8, 2003)

The entrepreneurial startup side of NPower NY made the
organization vulnerable to criticism that it was “in it for
the money” from more civic-minded (activist) competitors.
Delivering free services to the sector, for example, “Days of
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Service,” allowed NPower NY to make and substantiate claims
that it provided social goods as well. The matrix fee structure
was also an answer to these criticisms. By offering services
at different price points, NPower NY could claim to subsidize services to smaller organizations that might not be able to
afford such services. Moreover, the matrix fee structure allowed
NPower NY to make claims that it was managing financial
sustainability by generating earned revenue from delivering
high-skilled work to larger nonprofit organizations. Such claims
justified NPower NY’s practices to a diverse set of institutional
actors.
Justification
Activities such as Days of Service and the matrix fee structure allowed NPower NY to justify its businesslike practices and
ideals. For example, the executive director explained:
The bottom line is that in order to be an ongoing entity, we have
to protect the bottom line. I think that is one of the mistakes that
the other folks did not do was think enough about that. If you do
not think enough about that, you can shut your doors in a couple
of years if you do not watch out. We have got to be very aware of
that. I think that we walk that line carefully and I do not ever think
that it is mission or finances. It is both. In order to have the impacts
you want to make, you have to understand how a really good solid
grounding of both of those works. And they will interact with each
other, but you cannot just think about doing good and not think about
whether you are financially viable . . . all this money allows us to do
things like free training weeks and to lower the prices on some of
our services. I do not think they make that distinction, they just say
all we do is talk about money all day. Well, the money is going to
good stuff. If we make it, then we share that. It is not like it is going
to the board of directors in the form of bonuses. That, I think people
lose sight of, but I think it is important for us to never lose sight of
that. (personal interview, December 8, 2003)

In the extended quote, it is clear that the executive director
of NPower NY is justifying the organization’s focus on generating revenue. However, the justification blends market and civic
principles: The executive director claims that making money
means the organization can continue to provide services to the
nonprofit sector, which will ultimately help the communities
these organizations serve. A board member told me, “[NPower
NY] is the best combination of the energy and enthusiasm
you find in a startup with the walk-through-walls commitment
to mission that you find at the most altruistic of nonprofits”
(personal interview, May 6, 2003).
Justification is necessary to gain and maintain the legitimacy of actions (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). As noted earlier,
the literature on impression management shows how organizational responses to criticisms are more likely to be successful if
they align with the institutional precepts of the field. However,
social enterprises, like NPower NY, operate in fields governed
by multiple institutions. Such a condition requires organizations to blend justifications that make sense to multiple stakeholders with different institutional expectations simultaneously.
NPower NY’s blending of justificatory principles represents an
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entrepreneurial strategy of keeping multiple moral logics in play
(Stark, 2009). For example, the matrix fee structure reflects such
a pragmatic compromise between the business-like drives of
for-profit partners and the institutional expectations of members of the nonprofit sector. It allows NPower NY to justify its
practices simultaneously to both sides of the institutional divide.
Such justifications are necessary to maintain legitimacy, especially under conditions of institutional multiplicity
(Jarzabkowski, Matthiesen, & Van de Ven, 2009). In doing
so, NPower NY responds to criticism from multiple moral
standpoints simultaneously, while at the same time, preserving a space for action: The executive director’s choices of
practices to adopt as well as how to adapt them for NPower
NY’s circumstance reflect a form of agency within constraint.
To competing, politically progressive NTAPs, the organization
claims to provide an important social good, for example, “free
training weeks” and reduced prices for technology services.
To its business partners and donors, the organization claims to
be financially responsible with their donations. The balance of
market and social values was effective in maintaining a diverse
set of supporters. Donations continued between for-profit partners and nonprofit foundations alike. In their 2002 annual
report, NPower NY counts 21 entities that provided support.
Three are corporations; eight are corporate foundations; seven
are independent nonprofit foundations; and the remainder are
individual donors.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Criticism works when sources attack targets, requiring them
to produce justifications for their behavior or risk losing legitimacy. In the case of NPower NY, detractors faced difficulty
criticizing business behavior because market justifications are
taken for granted in many arenas of social life (Boltanski &
Chiapello, 2005). For example, even with the degree to which
commercial practices are widespread in the nonprofit sector
(Child, 2010), nonprofit organizations increasingly rely on market justifications in their discourse on service delivery (Frumkin
& Andre-Clark, 2000; Young, 2003). Still, interpreting criticism
and formulating appropriate responses puts the organization in
a state of uncertainty. Seemingly nonlegitimate actors at one
point in time might become legitimate at another. Nonlegitimate
extrainstitutional actors may influence legitimate intrainstitutional actors (King & Soule, 2007). Denunciations interpreted
as nonlegitimate by the target might be considered legitimate
to other actors in the field. Responding to every denunciation
and/or every detractor as legitimate consumes resources that
are better spent elsewhere. Responses themselves send signals
to other actors in the environment, which may judge them inadequate. Therefore, organizations must be careful in how they
interpret denunciations, understand their sources, and formulate
responses. It is this uncertainty that provides opportunities for
strategic action.
An organization’s response to criticism reflects strategy
under constraint. Managers have some choice as to whether

and/or how to respond. However, their choices are constrained
by how they perceive other actors in the field will respond
to their responses. In this way, responses are signals to other
organizations in the field about how the responder wants to
be understood. Endogenization is the process by which organizations take on institutionalized practices from the field and
attempt to translate them to accord with local exigencies,
such as demands from contradictory institutional expectations.
Translation preserves a space of agency under constraint, as it
reflects managers’ ability to interpret situations and make judgments about courses of action. Endogenization is constrained by
whether and how the practices in question are institutionalized
in the strategic action field.
As the case of NPower NY demonstrates, successful
endogenization produces its own justifications: The organization justifies its “businesslike” behavior, while creating programs and engaging in activities that stress the social bottom
line to the neglect of the financial one. Such responses depend
in large part on the specificity or diffuseness of the criticism.
Some criticisms are pointed: They derive from recognizable
sources and make specific demands. Such criticisms often
require immediate and explicit responses. Everyday criticisms,
such as rumors, hang in the institutional environment diffusely,
for example, the generalized complaint from competing NTAPs
that NPower NY was too “businesslike.” Such a criticism might
not take explicit form or come from a single well-defined or
institutionally recognizable actor. Conditions of institutional
multiplicity further complicate matters. Responding to diffuse
criticisms under such conditions presents a challenge to organizations: How can managers formulate a response that justifies
their actions to a diverse set of institutional expectations?
The evidence presented in this article shows that responses
to criticism are neither automatic (dictated by institutional
forces) nor straightforward (strategic). Criticisms and responses
affect organizational forms and practices in profound ways.
Organizations are shaped as they endogenize practices (institutionalized or not) from the field. Endogenizing as a response
is thus a mechanism of organizational imprinting, particularly in nascent or contested fields, in which neither moral
nor cognitive legitimacy is established (Johnson, 2007). Under
such conditions, organizations are constrained to respond to
criticisms from actors in their fields. Organizational imprinting concerns how forces outside of an organization shape such
forms and practices (Stinchcombe, 1965). When an organization endogenizes a response, criticism becomes a mechanism of
organizational imprinting.
When endogenizing allows organizations to successfully justify their actions, they promote new ways of doing things
in the field. When new ways of doing things become recognized as the “right and proper” ways of doing things, justification is a form of institutional entrepreneurship. In such a
case, establishing moral legitimacy provides the foundations
for cognitive legitimacy. If other actors in the field adopt the
matrix fee structure, its creation would be a case of institutional
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entrepreneurship. When an organization justifies prevailing
ways of doing things in the field, the result is institutional
maintenance, itself a form of “institutional work” (Lawrence,
Suddaby, & Leca, 2009a; Zilber, 2009). This was the case for
Days of Service, adopted by NPower NY but reinforcing an
existing practice in the field.
By exploring the case of a social enterprise, I have shown
how responses to criticism shape organizations and their practices. This article contributes to research on agency under
constraint by showing how the potential for establishing new
practices arises from the strategic actions of managers as they
respond to criticism. This article shows how strategic choices
among possible responses to criticisms from actors in the field
can turn ordinary entrepreneurs into institutional entrepreneurs.
Institutional entrepreneurs face serious challenges; chief among
these is establishing the moral legitimacy of their endeavors.
In translating institutionalized practices, managers exercise a
form of agency, especially when endogenization produces justification. Such justifications support the legitimacy of translated
practices. As Walgenbach and Meyer (2008, p. 192) explain,
“The institutionalization of a new organizational form presupposes, for example, the provision of a theorization that contains
legitimate justifications and accounts for this new organizational
form and makes the new form appear essential.”
Some caveats are necessary. Despite the success of the
matrix fee structure within NPower NY, I am unable to determine the degree to which it was adopted by others in the field.
Data presented here support the claim that the matrix fee structure was considered legitimate to members of the organization,
as well as representatives from the for-profit sector that sat on
the organization’s board. However, current data do not support
broader claims as to the legitimacy of the practice among competing NTAPs. Future research should examine the translation
of practices across organizations to determine which translations become legitimate to the field. More broadly, scholars
often argue that ethnographic studies have inherently limited
generalizability. I have taken steps, such as relating data to
theory throughout my time in the field, in order to preserve
the generalizability of this research. That said, the findings of
this research are limited to certain conditions, such as organizational fields with contradictory institutional expectations,
for example, nascent or contested fields; organizations that
are beholden to competing institutional demands and multiple groups of stakeholders; and finally, conditions of everyday criticism. Organizational crises often require extraordinary
responses, which may be purely symbolic or may only affect
organizational practices for a limited period of time.
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